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a call to resist 
illegitimate authority 
6 October 1972 763 Massachusetts Avenue, 14, Cambridge, Mass. 02139 Newsletter #66 
MEI 
, 
TERROR FROM THE SKY 
Because of the gravity of U.S. attacks on the 
dike system of North Vietnam we are reprinting this 
month a section of a report titled ''Terror from 
the Sky" prepared by John Gliedman for the Vietnam 
Resource Centre in Cambridge, Mass. We have also 
received in the last couple of weeks, a report 
from Yves Lacoste, Professor of Geography at the 
University of Paris, Who has recently returned 
from Vietnam. He will be presenting this report 
to the International Commission to Investigate 
War Crimes at an upcoming conference in Stockholm. 
Professor Lacoste's findings are as tragic in 
their consequence for the Vietnamese people as 
are those of John Gliedman. 
In the closing stages of the Korean war, the 
U.S.A.F. was given the task of destroying the dams 
of North Korea. An official U.S. account of the war 
states that "these strikes, largely passed over by 
the press, the military observer• and newscommentators 
in favor of attention arresting and less meaningful ' 
events, constituted one of the most significant 
operations of the Korean war ••• o To the Communists 
the smashing of the dams meant primarily the ' 
smashing of their chief sustenance - rice ••• (and with 
t-'h .. t-"\ ot-o ..... 7!:lt-inn ~nd slow death". 
The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal a generation 
ago sentenced to death Seyss-Inquart who as 
German High Commissioner for Holland in 1944 h d 
ordered the destruction of the Dutch dikes t' ~ 
the Allied advance. On April 30 this year ino Ts ow 
• PY!l'I, 
Nixon referred to the Vietnamese dikes as "strat-
egic targets"' indicating that he now accepted 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff long standing definition 
of them as legitimate targets; he refused to rule 
out attacks on them in the near future 0 
continued on page 2 
\/\/HY VOTE? 
THE VIETNAMESE AND US 
Andrew Himes 
(Note: This article does not necessarily represent 
Resist's editorial position. ed.) 
The chronicle of the Nixon years is grisly: 
4.5 million Indochinese civilians killed, wounded, 
or refugeed. 1.5 million soldiers on all sides 
killed or wounded. 40,000 Vietnamese civilians 
executed without trial under the Phoenix program. 
3.7 million tons of bombs dropped, 2 tons every 
60 seconds. 13 million bomb craters. 750,000 acres 
of crop and forest land bull-dozed over. $59 bil-
lion expended. 
The Nixon-Thieu partnership, especially since the 
resumption of heavy, saturation bombing in April, 
has wreaked an incredible degree of human and phy-
sical destruction on Indochina. It would be inex-
cusable if we did not take and fight for every 
chance we get to end the war on the terms of the 
Vietnamese people. We cannot afford the luxury of 
the unthreatened. 
George McGovern is the nominee of the Democratic 
Party. And McGovern, if he is elected, has it in 
his power to end the war. He has promised to stop 
all bombing of Indochina on inauguration day, to 
cease all support for the Thieu regime, and to 
withdraw all American troops and war materiel from 
Southeast Asia within 90 days. Politicians, as a 
breed, make promises they don't keep; McGovern is 
no exception. But those are exceptional promises. 
They are the linchpin, the heart and soul, of the 
McGovern candidacy. They mean the difference be-
tween life and death for millions of Indochinese 
people. The viability of those promises now cri-
tically needs analyzing and understanding. 
McGovern has repeatedly claimed that his defense 
budget, while slashing more than $30 billion in 
waste a,nd excess baggage from the current budget, 
would still leave the US "second to none" in mi-
litary power. If he is thus committed to main-
taining the US's hegemonic international influence, 
why would he grant self-determination to the Viet-
namese? The answer lies in the changing attitudes 
of military and civilian decision-makers through-
out the war. First, they have never questioned In-
dochina's critical importance to US interests. 
It is important not primarily because of its eco-
nomic exploitability, its trade potential, or its 
wealth of natural resources, but because it forms 
the keystone of America's defensive strategy in 
Asia; it is a vital link in the US's chain of al-
lied client states encircling China. Its loss 
would threaten the stability of the US's world 
systemo As Richard Duboff says, in the Gravel edi-
tion of the Pentagon Papers, "(Already by 1954), 
South Vietnam was held to be vital to American 
security, its future was not to be subject to 
negotiation of any sort, and it had to be defended 
by military action - including US intervention -
if need be. (This has remained the hard core of 
continued on page 4 • 
THE PROSPECTS FDR 
MASS DRO\NNING 
The Red River Delta is North Vietnam's heartlar,d. 
Here most of its people live - some 12.5 million. 
Here is where most of its farmland is located and 
most of its food produced. Here too is where the 
danger of floods during the rainy season is greatest, 
and where the dike system has been painfully constructed 
over a thousand years. The region's dependence on 
its flood control system - the drainage ditches·, 
pumping stations, dams, but most especially the dikes• 
is absolute. Without these great earthwork fort• 
ifications nearly two thirds of the plain's farm• 
land would be inundated every summer. Without the 
dikes all cultivation in the wet and the' dry season 
would be frustrated: 
The Red River must be surrounded· by embankments 
in order for the delta to be fit for cultivation. 
Indeed ••• (without them it) would block all attetnl)ts 
at agriculture. Every year, on the average, 
the fifth month rice,(harvested in June) would be· 
lost. Two years out of three, the transplanted 
seedlings for the tenth month rice (harvested in 
November) would be destroyed ••• so late in the 
growing season that they would not be replaced in 
time to get an acceptable crop. Rice culture is 
only possible if the Red River is contained by dikes. 
It is impossible to obtain a harvest from October 
to May. The most important crop, that of the tenth 
month, is reaped in November: the rice thrives on 
the heavy summer rainfall; it ripens during the dry 
dry and sunny weather from October to December. 
The fifth month crop feeds on the high humidity . 
and periods of rain (during the dry season) 
and ripens during th~ heat of early Summer. There is 
no way to schedule a ~cops~ thac it could be 
entirely protected from the seasonal floods. A 
crop replanted in late October would suffer from 
dry and cracked soil because November and December 
are the driest months of the year .. Should it 
survive it would stagnate during the cold and 
sunless periods of mists and fine rains. Then, 
its stay in the soil uselessly lengthened _to six 
months, it would ripen in early May. The present 
agricultural rhythm is demanded by the climate. 
One could not imagine it any other wav. 
The source of the Delta's great vulnerability 
lies in a combination of the givens of geography 
and climate. As in the lowlands to the South, the 
region's rainfall is not evenly distributed 
throughout the year. At Hanoi something like two 
thirds of it falls during the wet season months 
of June through September and only about one 
seventh during the December to April dry season. 
The further South one goes in North Vietnam the 
later and shorter is the rainy season. Most of the 
precipitation during the wet season is accounted 
for by thunderstorms and by the one or two typhoons 
which graze the coast every year. As for the typhoons, 
the quantity of rain they can bring in their wake 
is enormous. Oddly enough the delta is not part 
of the Red River's watershed. The river's drainage 
basin lies to the North and Northwest, in the 
mountains of North Vietnam and in the plateau of 
Southern Yunnan. Slopes and drainage channels here 
are usually steep and great tracts of land are 
treeless. As a result a very large proportion of 
the region's rainfall -~omething like 50 percent• 
eventually finds its way to the sea. 
The river that is fed by this watershed is 
extraordinary. During the Winter it is a mere 
stream scarcely 2.5 meters deep at Hanoi, with a 
flow rate of 700 cubic meters per second. Barely 
five months later it is a raging torrent which 
upon occasion has stood more than twelve meters 
high at Hanoi and discharged more than 23,000 
cubic meters a second. Upstream, where the Red 
River enters the delta at Viet Tri, the flow 
rate can reach 30,000 cubic meters a second. The 
flood season begins in June and extends through 
October. About half the time the river crests above 
7 meters at Hanoi at least once before June 30; 
in two years out of three it crests above this 
level at least three times after September 1. In 
most years the high water mark will exceed 9.5 
meters at Hanoi at least once. Still higher crests 
are fairly common. 
Such is the might of this great river whose 
peak discharge rate during the rainy season is 
twice that of the Nile and the Indus put together 
and equal to the maximum discharge rate of the 
Danube. The flooding of nearly two fifths of the 
delta's farmland lowered its water level less than 
ten per cent. 
The plain over which these enormvus masses of 
water roll every summer is flat, low and among the 
most densely populated rural areas in the world 
with an average density of 621 people per square 
kilometre (1580 people per square mile). In the 
Northwest, including all of the delta above the 
Red River and west of a line drawn parallel to the 
western side of Hai Duong province, the main rivers 
ride on a kind of "alluvial cushion .. which spills 
out over their banks for some way. These natural 
dikes are broken in many places and they stand two 
or three metres high above the surrounding plain. 
Because of their modest elevation, the ridges 
have long been favored as village sites. When they 
intemect they form enormous basins within which 
water tends to collect. It is upon this networ~ 
ot alluvium that the dike system in the Northwest 
is superimposed. Dikes are less frequent h~re 
than in other parts of the delta. In the main 
thev are confined to the banks of the major rivers. 
B~t they are higher and more massive than to the 
e.ast, where the river's maximum stages become 
progressively lower •. Though less densely peopled 
than other parts of the delta, densities are still 
very high. 
The land abruptly changes character as one moves 
eastward along the northern bank of the Red River 
In contrast to the northwest, where the rivers 
meander across the plain on top of alluvial ridges, 
stream beds are now usually lower than the surrounding 
plain. The main exception to this are the four fingers 
of land between the alluvial ridges of the "'Canal 
des Rapides", the Cau River, the Thuong River, the 
Luc Nam River and the hills of ·the "Sept ,agodes". 
This is an area menaced by serious flooding. If 
the three rivers rise simultaneously the lowlying 
basins are invaded and can only drain themselves 
slowly. 
to the south of the Red River and extending all 
the way from Viet Tri to the sea is the lower delta. 
It is the mostly densely populated part of the plain 
and probably the part which is most vulnerable to 
serious flooding should the dikes be destroyed. The 
land is low, but no lower on the average than in 
the eastern delta north of the Red River. But the 
area is criss-crossed by alluvial ridges and drain-
age is poor. As a result, when there is flooding 
here, the water pools because it has no place to 
go. The most important of the region's basins lies 
in the province of Ha Dong. Some 880,000 people 
live within its bounds, cultivating 107,000 hectares. 
The ridges of the Red River, the Phu Ly Canal, and 
embankments of the Day are the highest in the delta. 
They stand six meters above sea level while the 
surrounding basin is only two meters above sea level. 
Natural drainage is also quite poor in Son Tay 
province, which lies between the right bank of the 
Day and the mountains which mark the western border 
of the delta, and in Ha Nam province to the east of 
Ha Dong. All told, perhaps two thirds of the cultivated 
land to the south of the Red River is contained 
in lowlvin~ basins in which water naturally tends to 
collect. In 1960 some 1,740,000 people lived in 
these provinces. The figure is probably well over 
2 million today. 
The capital city of Hanoi and the provinces of 
Hung Yen and Bae Ninh on the north bank of the 
Red River occupy intermediary positions. Both Hung 
Yen and Bae Ninh are quite low. Elevations range from 
from 1 to 4 meters above sea level and 2 to 4 ~eters 
above sea level respectively. The southern part of 
Hung Yen is especially vulnerable to destruction of 
its dikes. Here the land is only 1 to 2 meters 
above sea level and the Red River can rise above 
7 meters in the rainy season. Still, natural 
drainage in this area is much better than in the great 
basins to the south. Some 1,171,400 people lived 
in the two provinces in 1960. The number is closer 
to one and a half million today. 
Hanoi itself stands on an alluvial ridge 6 meters 
above sea level. But parts of it are only 4 meters 
above sea level. As noted above the Red River 
often crests here during the rainy season at 10 
or 11 meters. Were the dikes to give way at their 
base during one of these periods, a wall of water 15 
15 feet high could roar through the streets of 
Hanoi. Its population in 1960 was 643,000. According 
to recent reports, 80 per cent of its people have 
been evacuated. One or two hundred thou~and have 
remained behind. 
Perhaps the best clue of all about the effects 
of an all-out attack on the dikes and dams comes 
from the Pentagon Papers. Buried in a discussion 
of North Vietnam's probable import capacity after 
the mining of its ports is an estimate of the amount 
of rice which it would have to import were its 
dikes and irrigation dams specifically targeted for 
destruction. Using this figure - 220,000 t ·o 920,000 
metric tons of rice- we can derive 160,000 to 685,000 
hectares as the ammount of riceland which the war-
planners envisioned flooding. Now, bearing in mind 
that the farmers who till this land live nearby 
- sometimes in villages built on low alluvial ridges, 
sometimes in -villages at the same level as their 
fields - we can make a rough estimate of the number 
of people who stand in danger of drowning if the dikes 
were destroyed without warning. For all we need to do 
is multiply the average population density of the 
delta• 621 per square kilometre - by the area of 
t~e land affected by flooding. To be sure When we 
o this, the high end of our estimate mu;t include 
areas in which the river level is not great enough 
to threaten human life (for the high estimate 
involved about half the arable land of the delta). 
Still, it is a sobering exercise. For when we do 
it we see that the war planners had in mind flooding 
an area containing from l million to 4.25 million 
people. This is over and beyond the hundreds and 
thousands of people who would be affected if the Red 
River dikes protecting Hanoi were destroyed. 
But, of course, as the President said on April 30, 
1972, the system of the dikes and dams is 11a strategic 
target and indirectly a military target". 
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Drawing by Laotian refugee. 
I 
In 1972 Glad Day Press, a movement shop in Ithaca, 
New York, produced the Viet Nam 1972 calendar. The 
calendar had three aims: to present some aspects 
of Vietnamese culture and history, to outline the 
U.S. war of aggression in Viet Nam and to relay 
information about the Vietnamese people's war of 
resistance-. 
Nixon's massive escalation of the war since April 
'72, coupled with his mystification of the American 
public through deceptive troop withdrawals, made 
an update of the Viet Nam calendar imperative. It 
was determined at the same time to include material 
on Laos and Cambodia, countries whose culture and 
whose ongoing resistance struggles have achieved 
significant victories. This led naturally to a 
proposed 1973 calendar on Indochina, which would 
serve as a year round reminder of the ongoing 
struggles there. 
While Glad Day worked on the Viet Nam calendar, 
other peace movement activists organized Medical 
Aid for Indochina. In only one year of existence, 
MAI has already provided liberated Indochina with 
medical supplies requested by health officials there, 
including some of the most modern equipment available. 
This success reflects MA.I's public information 
campaign and its organization of supply channels, 
despite the high intensity of hostile activity in 
the war zone. 
With Indo-China '73, the two groups are working 
jointly to realize their common aims. Proceeds from 
calendar sales will be split between MAI and Glad 
Day, which will use the funds to buy equipment to 
improve its anti-war printing capabilities. 
The total cost of the calendar and mailing is $3.75. 
Orders should be sent to; 
Glad Day Press 
308 Stewart Ave. 
Ithaca 
New York 14850. 
(607) 273-0535. 
The calendar is 28 pages, wall size (17 by 22), 
lithographed in color on heavy cream stock, has 
over 250 photographs and line drawings, poems, songs, 
stories, legends, history, protest art by students 
and soldiers and an Indo-China fact sheet. 
US policy in Vietnam ever since.)" What has wa-
vered is not America's strategic goal, but our 
leaders' confidence that the goal could be reached. 
This is evident in Kennedy's and Johnson's hesi-
tant, stop-and-go escalations. It is evident in 
McGovern's condemnation of the war in 1963, His 
vote for the Tonkin Gulf resolution in August, 
1964, his public support for Johnson's policy of 
strafing North Vietnam in early 1965, and his all-
out opposition to the war now. And it was evident 
when Johnson stopped bombing northern Vietnam, 
began the Paris talks, and retired from public 
life after building US troop strength up to an 
unprecedented 560,000. 
When Johnson was forced to halt the war's escala-
tion temporarily in 1968, he was on the defensive 
on several fronts. His popularity with the elec-
torate was at the lowest level of his Administration, 
while the anti-war movement was growing daily. He 
had just weathered the NI.F's politically and tac-
tically costly Tet offensive. War-spawned infla-
tion and balance of payments problems were plague-
ing the economy. And the huge commitment of mili-
tary resources to Vietnam was undermining this 
country's prestige and taxing its ability to act 
freely in the rest of the world. 
President McGovern's compelling influences would 
be somewhat different. First, the current PRG 
offensive has been militarily and politically 
disastrous for the Thieu regime. The offensive's 
goal was not to capture large cities, where both 
the liberation forces and the people could be de-
stroyed systematically by massive terror bombing. 
Instead, the goal was to draw the ARVN i .nto several 
defensive enclaves, where they could be harassed 
and decimated - while local NLF forces in the pro-
vinces, in the absence of Government soldiers, de-
stroyed pacification programs which had taken years 
to build. And the strategy is working - in Quangtri, 
Kontum, Anloc, Binh Dinh, Quangnai, the populous 
Mekong Delta - the PRG-NLF is stronger than ever. 
Thieu's army is increasingly being confined to the 
cities, and the Americans have already been con-
fined to the air, leaving most of the countryside 
to the liberation forces. In January, McGovern 
would face an untenable military situation, the 
absolute hatred of the Saigon regime, which has 
called him "an insane, lying dog, a raving, filthy 
pig," and he would face American people, with 
their newly encouraged hopes for peace. McGovern's 
candidacy has been largely predicated on his 
strong opposition to the war. He would have little 
option other than to carry out his pledge: peace, 
on the terms of the PRG-NLF. 
McGovern would not end the war because the Amer-
ican people trust him to, or hope he will, but be-
cause his political survival depends on it. The 
impatience and disillusionment of the American 
people, and the current liberation offensive in 
Vietnam have put the American government up against 
the wall. The election offers an auspicious op-
portunity for the final success of .the movement 
against the Vietnam war, and it also has in it 
the seeds of a tragic, long-term defeat. Nixon's 
July 17 press conference reminds us of the seri-
ousness of our effort. He said, "We do not con-
template using tactical .nuclear weapons at this 
~." After invasions . of Cambodia and Laos, bomb-
ing dik~s, mining harbors, and massive use of air 
power have failed to bring Vietnam to its knees, 
Nixon has only one further terrible weapon in his 
arsenal. And make no mistake. HP. is the kind of 
President who could very well use it. 
We should understand clearly who McGovern is, his 
limitations, his capacity for opportunism and be-
trayal of principles, his need to accomodate and 
cultivate people like Richard Daley and George Wal-
lace. And we should understand that George McGovern 
is a qualitative improvement over Richard Nixon. 
We must beware McGovern's weaknesses, and support 
McGovern. 
''Boston Legal Aid, A Reference Booklet", a guide 
to legal aid services in Boston is now available. 
Edited by Kent Jarrell, a Boston University 
senior, the booklet offers information on 25 
Boston .agencies that give assistance in the areas 
of criminal, civil, discrimination, prisoner, 
consumer protection, housing and military legal 
problems. 
Information supplied about each group includes 
addresses, contacts, phone numbers, staffing, types 
of cases accepted, eligibility requirements, 
funding, history and breakdown of cases. 
Copies may be ordered from Sensory Press, 45 
Waverly Avenue, Newton at $2.50 each plus .08 
Mass. sales tax and .23 for postage. 
SEPTEMBER GRANTS 
Indiana Peace and Freedom Party, Muncie.Indiana; 
A small grant to encourage them in their work of 
organizing high school students, women and pub-
lishing a newsletter. 
Ujamaa, St. Petersburg, Florida; Help with pro-
blems they have had over the Summer. Ujamaa is 
an independent black restaurant whose funtion is 
to raise money for the Black Movement. 
West Chicago Workers' Centre; For rent and office 
equipment to establish a meeting place, produce 
leaflets and newspaper and provide a centre where 
workers can gather to discuss their situation. · 
Jackson Human Rights Project, Jackson, Miss.; 
Aid in purchasing a house for their school. 
The school was started in '68 to provide 
meaningful education for black children. 
Charleston Community Project, Charleston, s.c.; 
Seed money toward their general running costs 
The project consists of 4 men and 1 woman who 
live together and work with servicemen, women 
and veterans. 
VVAW 1 Tuscaloosa, Alabama; Assistance in 
paying off the debt on their newsletter. They 
have been actively organizing in the Alabama 
region with considerable success. 
Selma Project, Tuscaloosa, Alabama; Help 
with purchasing a movie projector to be used by 
them and other people in Alabama. 
Hope Centre, Tucson, Arizona; For costs in 
running a methadone centre which works mainly 
with Chicanos but also with Indians in the area. 
Prison Law Collective, San FranciSCQ.i. Toward an 
ongoing program work~ng with prisoners in Folsom 
and San Quentin and helping build consciousness 
of prisons and their function in society. 
